insisted that Britain and Italy should furnish three more divisions for the Salonika Army, without any clear idea in their minds as to the purpose they were intended to serve. For defence they were superfluous ; for attack they would be insufficient. The British and Italians were emphatic that they could not do this, and that the few ships available should be utilised to fill up the undoubted weakness of the units already on the spot. If an overwhelming attack came from the North, of which they were doubtful, the forces there should be prepared to withdraw to a shorter line.

General SarraiPs acutest anxiety was about the safety of his left flank in the event of enemy attacks on his front. On ist December, 1916, parties landed in Athens to enforce the fulfilment by the Greek King of Allied demands, and had been attacked by his troops. There was a real danger that any frontal attack by the enemy on the Salonika forces would be the signal for an outbreak of hostilities by the Greek Royalist troops in their rear, which would make their position one of acute jeopardy,

SarraiPs fear of Greek attack

In view of this situation, General Sarrail came to me on the third morning of the conference for a personal interview.

He was one of those rare personalities of whom no one can form a moderate opinion. To his partisans he was a brilliant genera], to his

critics he *Sketch of* was a bounding charlatan. Joffre said *Sarrail* there was nothing he had done in the fight in France that would justify the view that he was an able general. Another distinguished Frenchman that I met said that SarraiPs fight against the Germans in the Nancy area was one of the finest feats